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01 NOV 1979, dodd 5200.10 gp-4; AGo D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980	

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (8 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674191

13 February 1968

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st  
Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th Artillery, Period Ending 31 Oct 1967(U)

**TO:** SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by  
USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in  
accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and cor-  
rective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of re-  
ceipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure  
appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current  
operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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as


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1st BATTALION (AW) (SP) 44TH ARTILLERY  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96269

AVFA-AT-1/44-0

1 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

TO: See Distribution

**SECTION I (U) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES**

**1. (C) General**

a. The organization structure of this battalion is as follows:

ASSIGNED

HQ & HQ Battery, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery  
Battery A, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery  
Battery B, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery  
Battery C, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery  
Battery D, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery

ATTACHED

Battery G (Machinegun Caliber .50), 65th Artillery  
Battery G (Searchlight), 29th Artillery (Administration and  
Courts-Martial Jurisdiction)

b. The battalion remained under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division during the reporting period and the positioning of units as reported in previous ORLL remains unchanged. Battery G, 29th Artillery remains in support of USMC and U.S. Army units in the I Corps Tactical Zone from Da Nang south.

c. The primary mission of the battalion continues to be that of direct ground support of 3d Marine Division elements as announced in the last ORLL. The battalion maintains its capability to perform its air defense mission as a secondary role.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
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674191

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## 2. (C) Intelligence:

The Battalion S2 continued to attend daily intelligence briefings conducted by the 3d MARDIV (FWD) located at Dong Ha. Additional intelligence was obtained from battalion units in the field and from situation reports from Marine units operating in this tactical area. Other intelligence was obtained from patrols operating in Sector II of the Dong Ha Combat Base. The sector is the responsibility of the battalion, and is a part of the overall defense for the Dong Ha Combat Base. One third of the patrols were provided by batteries of the battalion. Daily, an intelligence briefing was conducted by the Battalion S2 for the battalion staff and batteries located at the Dong Ha Combat Base. Battery C, located at Camp J.J. Carroll, received their intelligence from the 3d Marine Regiment. Battery D, based at Phu Bai, obtained their intelligence from the 4th Marine Regiment. All intelligence gathered by battalion members is forwarded through the Battalion S2 to the 3d MARDIV (FWD) S2 for further evaluation. During August and September, the enemy increased his artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks against US bases in this area. Dong Ha and Camp J.J. Carroll came under heavy artillery/rocket attacks both day and night. On 3 September, The Vietnamese Presidential Election Day, NVA artillery successfully hit the Dong Ha ammunition supply point and completely destroyed it along with a large store of Class III supplies. The Provisional Artillery Battalion at Gio Linh also saw an increase in artillery and recoilless rifle rounds. However, Con Thien was the focal point of the enemy artillery effort as throughout August and September the rounds received there increased multifold. During the latter part of September for a two week period, the outpost received as high as 800 to 1000 rounds a day. The enemy employed time and delay fuses in addition to the normal impact type. Propaganda leaflets were delivered by the enemy at Con Thien using artillery rounds. This material was well prepared and compared favorably with any US propaganda of a similar nature. For the first two months of the reporting period, there were significant sightings of the enemy around the Con Thien area. The enemy attempted several probes on the perimeter, but no major attacks were launched. However, several large scale engagements were fought in the vicinity of Con Thien. Significant about these contacts was that the enemy used forward observers to call in accurate rocket, artillery, and mortars on friendly forces. Intelligence indicated that most artillery pieces firing on US forces were located north of the Ben Hai river. Enemy attempts to interdict roads in the area with mines continued. Standard Soviet and Chicom products were used along with artillery shells and undetonated aircraft bombs. The greatest increase in this type activity occurred along the main supply routes connecting Dong Ha to Gio Linh, and Cam Lo to Con Thien. Enemy ambushes of road nets increased and caused several casualties within the battalion. During September an enemy reinforced squad-sized force ambushed an engineer sweep team, that was escorted by one M-55 from this unit, within 800 meters of the Gio Linh outpost. Within fifteen seconds the enemy force killed or wounded every man in the force.

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1 November 1967

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Three enemy ambushes on Route 9 between the Rockpile and Ca Lu resulted in heavy casualties for both sides. The enemy threat coupled with bad road conditions caused by early monsoon rains has virtually closed Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh which is entirely resupplied by air at the present time. Since the advent of the monsoon rains, road conditions have degenerated. Engineer efforts to build an all weather road to resupply Con Thien continues when weather permits. Since the rain has started, there has been significant decreases in enemy activity, sightings, and artillery attacks.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities:

a. Plans:

Continue direct support of USMC combat forces in the 3d Marine Division tactical area of responsibility.

b. Operations:

(1) The battalion and elements of Battery G, 65th Artillery have participated in the following operations during the reporting period:

Kingfisher - 1 August 67 to present (Batteries A, B, C and G/65)  
Ardmore - 1 August 67 to present (Batteries A and G/65)  
Highrise - 1 August 67 to present (Battery A)  
Cumberland - 1 August to 15 September 67 (Batteries D and G/65)  
Fremont - 1 August 67 to present (Batteries D and G/65)

(2) During the reporting period, perimeter defense of Dong Ha Combat Base was provided by M42 weapons of batteries A and B; perimeter defense of Camp J. J. Carroll was provided by Battery C; and Battery D provided perimeter defense of Phu Bai. M55 weapons of Battery G, 65th Artillery were utilized daily primarily for convoy security escorts throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone in support of USMC operations.

(3) The battalion and attached units were engaged in tactical operations daily throughout the reporting period (92 days). Inclosure 1 lists significant missions performed by the battalion and Battery G, 65th Artillery. At the end of the quarterly period 31 October 1967, the battalion was tactically deployed in direct support as follows:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>
HHB/1/44	Dong Ha	1st Battalion, 44th Artillery
A (-)/1/44	Dong Ha	9th Marine Regiment
B (-)/1/44	Dong Ha	9th Marine Regiment
C (-)/1/44	J.J. Carroll	3d Marine Regiment
D (-)/1/44	Phu Bai	4th Marine Regiment
G (-)/65	Dong Ha	9th Marine Regiment
A/1/44 2 Sect	Gio Linh	Provisional Artillery Battalion
A/1/44 1 Sect	The Sanh	Senior Officer Present 3d Marine Division
B/1/44 1 Squad	Quang Tri	USA Advisory Group
B/1/44 2 Sect	Cam Lo	3d Battalion, 4th Marines
B/1/44 1 Sect	Con Thien	3d Battalion, 9th Marines
C/1/44 1 Squad	Khe Gio Bridge	3d Marine Regiment
C/1/44 1 Sect	Ca Lu	3d Battalion, 3d Marines
C/1/44 2 Sect	Rockpile	3d Battalion, 3d Marines
C/1/44 1 Sect	Mai Dan	3d Marine Regiment
D/1/44 2 Sect	Camp Evans	4th Marine Regiment
D/1/44 1 Sect	Nam Hoa	4th Marine Regiment
D/1/44 1 Squad	Gia Le	4th Marine Regiment

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Le Quang Le (ICS CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

1 November 1967

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>
G/65 2 Squads	Khe Sanh	Senior Officer Present 3d Marine Division
G/65 3 Squads	Con Thien	3d Battalion, 9th Marines
G/65 3 Squads	J. J. Carroll	Battery C, 1st Battalion 44th Artillery
G/65 4 Squads	Phu Bai	Battery D, 1st Battalion 44th Artillery
G/65 3 Squads	Camp Evans	4th Marine Regiment
G/65 4 Squads	Chu Lai	Americal Division

#### C. Training:

(1) The Battalion established a separate 5 day familiarization training program for replacement personnel on the M-42 and M-55 automatic weapons systems. Personnel assigned to the battalion with experience on the automatic weapons system receive a one day orientation program. Battery Commanders continue an intensified training program for these personnel until they are sufficiently trained to perform in tactical operations.

(2) The majority of the daily training program (92 days) was concentrated on QJT at the section and squad level due to the influx of new personnel. This influx was caused by rotation of a large percentage of the battalion personnel to CONUS.

(3) The requirement for squad and section level training was also necessary due to the wide dispersal of battery elements throughout the ICTZ. There has been no time when an entire battery has been together to allow for battery size classes.

#### d. Chemical:

During the month of October, enemy forces used smoke and riot control agents during an attack on a marine infantry position south of Con Thien. Use of these agents aided the enemy during his attack, and substantiated the previous reports of possible enemy use of chemical agents in this tactical area. The 3d MARDIV had already directed that all personnel deployed to field locations have protective masks in their possession.

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SUBJECT: Operations Report (Landing Zone) (RCS FOR-65) for  
Quarterly Report (Landing Zone) (RCS FOR-65) for

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## e. PSYWAR:

During the reporting period, no payments were made from the VN\$5000 Piasters Reward Program. This program is established IAW 3d MARDIV Order 7230.1, dated 6 February 1967.

## 4. (C) Logistics:

Logistics support by the supporting task force organizations have shown a gradual improvement and should show further improvement with the establishment of a DX facility at the supporting task force level. At the present time DX parts are tagged and turned in and the part is then requisitioned thru normal supply channels rather than receiving a DX part across the counter as the unserviceable part is turned in. This method results in unnecessary delays in returning a major end item to an operational status. Signal equipment that cannot be repaired within a thirty-day time frame must be turned in to the task force maintenance activity, dropped from the property book and then the new major item or component must be requisitioned.

## 5. (U) Civil Affairs:

a. Dai An Hamlet (YD 270590): The eight pigs given to Dai An during the last quarter have been well cared for by the Hamlet and have gained from forty pounds to approximately 125 pounds each. The battalion at Dong Ha continued to supply waste daily from the mess halls to feed the pigs. The original shelter that was started to house the pigs was abandoned because the building was built forward of village living quarters, which was contrary to some local religious customs. At present, a new shelter is almost complete.

b. During the quarterly reporting period, the battalion employed local nationals from the Cam Lo (YD 115578) Refugee Hamlet for the purpose of filling sandbags for bunkers and gun positions. In October the battalion began using persons from the village of Dai An for the same purpose. These persons were paid with USAID commodities under the supervision of the Battalion Executive Officer. Scrap lumber from packing crates was also donated to the Gio Linh Sector Commander for the purpose of building desks in a Vietnamese school at Ha Thanh (YD 223698).

c. Battery B distributed 1500 combs and 1500 sets of barrettes donated by citizens in the United States to the Dong Ha Catholic Orphanage. The battery has also provided transportation for the movement of excess B-rations to the Orphanage mess facility.

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d. Battery D presents a monthly contribution to the Vien Duc-Anh Orphanage Home in Hie. This home contains over 500 needful children. In addition, all scrap lumber which can be obtained is utilized to help reconstruct the dwellings of the civilian help employed in the battery mess hall.

e. MEDCAP:

(1) The Battalion Surgeon and the Medical Section treated approximately 2,000 patients in connection with MEDCAP during the reporting period. The patients were visited and treated at the following locations: Dai An (YD 259398), and Dong Ha (YD 236608).

(2) When any serious pathology was discovered during the Battalion MEDCAP Program, the Vietnamese national was transported by the Battalion Medical Section to the civilian hospital at Quang Tri for further evaluation and treatment.

6. (C) Personnel:

a. Awards and Decorations: During the period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, the battalion and attached units sustained sixty battle casualties of which six were killed in action. 135 awards were presented during the reporting period:

(1) Silver Star	- 1
(2) Bronze Star w/"V" device	- 16 (4 Posthumously)
(3) Bronze Star	- 12
(4) Army Commendation w/"V" device	- 8
(5) Army Commendation Medal	- 38
(6) Purple Heart	- 60 (6 Posthumously)

b. Religious Activities:

Sunday services have been held at the Battalion Chapel providing services for Headquarters, A, and B Batteries 1/44, and G/65. Afternoon services for C Battery are held in the mess hall at Camp J.J. Carroll. It is not possible to conduct group services at most of the locations due to both the nature of the work, and the fact that these are small units dispersed over large geographical areas acting in a support role. Since joining this unit, on 17 October 1967, the Battalion Chaplain has visited the following locations: Gio Linh, Quang Tri, Dia An Village, Cam Lo, Da Nang, Khe Sanh, Ca Lu, Phu Bai, D-5, Rockpile, and elements with the Americal Division south of Da Nang.

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These visits give the men an opportunity to discuss their work as well as personal matters with the Battalion Chaplain. An important part of these contacts is the literature and good reading material that is left to be read following the personal visit. Attempts will be made to visit all units a minimum of once each month. Public services are held by Chaplains serving with the Marines in outlying locations not easily accessible by the Battalion Chaplain, and in most instances, our men can attend these services.

c. Education:

Since 1 August 1967, ten individuals have taken the High School GED test and ten individuals have taken the College General Examinations. Five persons enrolled in correspondence courses offered through USAFI. Also, two took end of course examinations.

7. (C) Artillery

a. Ammunition expended 1 August 1967 - 31 October 1967:

40MM - 60,542  
Caliber .50 - 195,310

b. Ammunition expended to date:

40MM - 385,109  
Caliber .50 - 1,123,825

8. (C) Other:

This battalion was unable to commit an average of five M-42's and six M-55's during the period of 14 September 1967 - 31 October 1967, because of a personnel shortage.

SECTION II (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (C) Personnel

a. Item: Infusion Program.

Discussion: An infusion program was started to equalize the number of personnel returning to the CONUS in any one month. This program was only marginally successful because: (1) Most of the personnel infused in this battalion have a DEROS of February, and (2) only one other similar battalion was involved.

Observation: In order to be successful, infusion programs must be completely staffed at all levels. In addition, wherever possible as many similar type battalions as feasible should be included in any infusion program to permit infusion of personnel with rotation dates that fall throughout the year.

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SUBJECT: Operation Report-Lesson Learned (OC CSFOR-65) for  
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**CONFIDENTIAL**b. Item: Replacements

Discussion: Replacements are arriving from two to six weeks after the personnel they are to replace. As a result, this battalion was short an average of five complete M-42 crews and six complete M-55 crews during the period 14 September - 31 October 1967.

Observation: Timely arrival of replacements is essential so that 100% effectiveness of committed battalions is maintained.

## 2. (C) Operations:

a. Item: 40mm round ricochets.

Discussion: On two occasions, 40mm rounds impacted and failed to explode. Instead, the rounds ricocheted and traveled in excess of 1500 meters, exploding in friendly villages.

Observation: Extreme care must be utilized when firing 40mm guns into areas where ricochets could occur and could carry into friendly areas.

b. Item: M42 local security.

Discussion: In several instances, enemy ambushes have been initiated from positions between five and twenty meters from the road. The main armament of the M42 is incapable of effective engagement at enemy forces, at such short ranges.

Observation: M-42 crews must be prepared to defend there weapon with small arms, grenades and any other means during ambushes as the main armament may be ineffective due to close proximity of enemy elements.

c. Item: Emergency M-42 crews.

Discussion: When heavily engaged, some members of M-42 crews have become casualties, reducing the efficiency of the M-42.

Observation: Where possible, troops from supporting units should be trained to take over for crew members of the M-42 who become casualties.

d. Item: M-42 in ground support operations.

Discussion: Vietnamese farmers use barbed wire to inclose their fields. Cross country operation of the M-42 in such areas often results in barbed wire becoming entangled in tracks and drive sprockets. Several people and much valuable time are required to untangle the wire.

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Observation: Either a member of the supported unit or a member of the M-42 should precede the vehicle to warn the driver of hidden wire obstacles.

e. Item: M-42 operations in rice paddies.

Discussion: Operations in rice paddies during the monsoon season are hazardous for a fully tracked vehicle. The top twelve inches of soil are firm, but under the layer no solid soil layer is found. Any turning of the M-42 results in the vehicle becoming hopelessly mired. Freeing the vehicle requires much time and effort.

Observation: M-42's should stay out of rice paddies during the monsoon season. If an M-42 must proceed into a paddy to accomplish its mission, it should proceed in a straight line.

f. Item: M-42 spare parts carried on extended operations.

Discussion: On extended operations, the following parts experience more than normal wear: Breechblocks, extractors, firing pins, recoil cylinders and inner cranks. Due to the distance from battery and battalion support and the lack of aerial resupply support, replacement of these parts from battery or battalion supply is difficult.

Observation: At least two spare breechblocks, extractors, recoil cylinders, four firing pins, and one pair of inner cranks should be carried with each two M-42's committed on extended operations.

g. Item: M-42 field expedient repairs.

Discussion: The following parts often break during operations where repair is imperative: Feed pawl pins and azimuth traversing universal joint pins. These parts are not always available due to supply channel delays.

Observation: Feed pawl pins and azimuth universal joint pins may be replaced by quarter in. bolts until spare parts are received.

h. Item: M-55 security on search and destroy missions.

Discussion: Two M-55's providing security for a ground search and destroy mission were required to enter a village. One M-55 remained outside the village and the other entered, facing forward. About half way through the village, the M-55 in the village was fired on from the front. The cut out switches prevented the M-55 from returning the fire. The truck was forced to back out of the village under fire.

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Observation: M-55's should be backed into villages on search and destroy missions to facilitate withdrawal if necessary. One of the M-55's should be placed in a flanking position to cover the searching vehicle. Ground forces should provide additional flank and point security for M-55's entering villages and other built-up areas.

3. (C) Training and Organization:

Item: Training of M-42 crew replacements.

Discussion: Much of the firing done by M-42's is done while moving. A great deal of skill and teamwork is required by the azimuth and elevation trackers on the M-42 to successfully bring continuous fire onto a target while they are moving.

Observation: M-42 crew replacements need more training during AIT on engaging targets while they are in motion.

4. (U) Intelligence: NONE

5. (C) Logistics:

a. Item: Bunker Material.

Discussion: Required bunker material has not been received in any appreciable quantity. That which has been received has not been pretreated with creosote to prevent rotting. Very little chlorodane is available to treat soil around bunkers to prevent termites from destroying wooden walls.

Observation: Empty 40mm ammunition cans and 175mm powder cannisters, filled with dirt or sand, make excellent side walls and overhead support for bunkers. Tar paper placed on the outside of wooden walls helps in prevention of rotting and waterproofing.

b. Item: Direct Exchange Facility.

Discussion: Many items submitted to higher echelons for repair cannot be repaired and returned to the using unit in 30 days. This is particularly true of signal items such as the RT-542's for the AN/URC-12.

Observation: Establishment of a direct exchange facility would allow rapid exchange of deadlined items for operational items.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report: Personnel (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending October 1967

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6. (C) Others:

a. Communications.

Item: Crewmans Helmet, T-56-6

Discussion: The Crewmans Helmet, T-56-6 is the only type of microphone/headset system in use for both FM radio (VEC-12 series), and intercommunication set communications in the M-42. During periods of excessive or extremely hard rains the microphone elements and cable connections to the receiver/transmitter become wet, causing either a condition of continuous transmitter keying or a signal feedback which produces a loud squealing sound at receiving stations.

Observation: Continuous keying of the transmitter by any single M-42 caused by wet crewmans helmet seriously affects the ability of the unit to maintain adequate tactical communications with outlying, and mobile elements. Although not too serious, the signal feedback producing squeal does not allow adequate radio communications with the faulty station. Maximum effort must be made to prevent helmets from unnecessary exposure to wet weather. Additional precautions should be taken by taping all cable connections.

b. Maintenance.

Item: Fuels

Discussion: Water collects in fuel containers due to the high humidity and cooling during the hours of darkness. Dirt and rust are also more prevalent due to local conditions. These result in clogged fuel pumps, injectors and filters.

Observations: Water should be drained from fuel containers and fuel filters should be cleaned daily. If fuel injector pump failures result from rust and dirt, electrical control and spring loaded control parts can be cleaned without complete disassembly of the pump.

Part II, Recommendations:

1. (U) Personnel: Recommend that replacements be preprogrammed to arrive two weeks before DEROS of person to be replaced.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Recommend M-42 crew replacements be trained to fire while they are maneuvering.

b. Recommend M-42 and M-55 crew replacements be trained to defend their vehicles against close in ambushes with their individual weapons.

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AVFA-AT-1/44-C

1 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

3. (U) Training and Organization: NONE
4. (U) Intelligence: NONE
5. (U) Logistics: Recommend establishment of a Direct Exchange Facility at Dong Ha Combat Base.

1 Incl

~~Missions Performed~~ Withdrawn,  
Hqs, DA

*Robert M. McPherson*  
ROBERT M. MC PHERSON  
MAJ, Artillery  
Acting Commander

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17  
AVGL-CO (1 November 1967)

1st Ind

13 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: Commandir General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350

1. Forwarded : rewith is the Operational Report of the 1st Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th Artillery for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967. This report is being forwarded to your headquarters since the battalion was assigned to I Field Force Vietnam throughout the reporting period.

2. Concur in the recommendations made in Part II of Section II of the report, subject to the following comments:

a. Paragraph 1 (programming of replacements). An overlap between arriving and departing personnel is desirable, but probably is precluded by Department of the Army limitations on the number of personnel spaces (man years) which can be allocated to transients.

b. Paragraph 5 (DX facility at Dong Ha). A proposal that a direct exchange facility be established at the Dong Ha Combat Base has been made to the task force which supplies logistic support for Army units in the Dong Ha area, but no such facility has yet been established.

*David L. Jones*  
DAVID L JONES  
Colonel, Arty  
Commanding

AVFA-AT-D (1 Nov 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR) for Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 October 1967 (1st Bn, 44th Arty) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350, 29 November 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. Concur in the observations and recommendations contained in basic communication and previous indorsement.

2. Reference: Section II, Part I, paragraph 1a, page 8. Request for assistance concerning this infusion problem has been forwarded to Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam.

3. Reference: Section II, Part II, paragraph 1, page 12. Normally requisitions for officer replacements are scheduled so the replacement will arrive ten days in advance of the predecessors DEROS and enlisted personnel are requisitioned only by title month in accordance with USARV Reg 614-220.

4. Reference: Section II, Part II, paragraph 2b, page 12. It is recognized that all personnel in Basic Combat Training receive training in defending themselves with their individual weapon. The necessary training for defense against close in ambush should be conducted at unit level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DONALD L. BURTON  
MAJ, Arty  
Adjutant

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVFA-GC-OT (1 Nov 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 October 1967, RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WDDLA, 1st Bn, 44th Arty (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350


1 0 DEC 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has reviewed the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 and concurs with the observations and recommendations of the basic document as modified by previous indorsements except as follows:

Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 1a (page 8), Commander's Observations: Infusion problems should be alleviated by the USARV Infusion Program established in October 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



JAMES P. GASTON  
Captain, ACC  
Assistant Adjutant General

*Downgraded at 3 year Intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIR 5200.10*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 67)

4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 15 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP), 44th Artillery (DDLA) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning replacements, page 9, paragraph 1b; page 12, paragraph 1; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3:

(1) Every effort is made to provide enlisted replacements on a timely basis and in sufficient number to maintain all units at 100% of authorized strength. However, the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery shared the artillery requisition shortfall USARV experienced in September and October.

(2) This headquarters cannot control replacements' arrivals; these are spread randomly over the requisition month. Actual time of arrival is dependent on many factors: deferments, processing time, in-country movement, and local orientation training programs.

b. Reference item concerning replacement training, page 11, paragraph 3; page 12, paragraph 2; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 4: Concur in the recommendation that M-42 crew replacements receive more training during AIT on firing the weapon while moving. Concur with paragraph 4, 2d Indorsement. Personnel should receive sufficient training in AIT to become proficient in the use of their individual weapons and be proficient in their MOS. Unit commanders should maintain unit proficiency and improve individual skills through unit training programs.

c. Reference item concerning direct exchange facility, paragraph 5b, page 11; and paragraph 5, page 13: Nonconcur. Maintenance float is intended to assist in the rapid return of inoperable equipment. Direct exchange is used in minor components and assemblies. This command is authorized a 5% maintenance float. There is a shortage of maintenance float components. When adequate stocks are available, this problem should be greatly reduced.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. S. NAKATSUKASA

Captain, AGC

17 Assistant Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT(1 Nov 67) (U) 5th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October  
1967 from HQ, 1st Bn (AW)(SP) 44th Arty (UIC: WDDLAA)  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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